2012-04-08 01:07:35
By JONATHAN FREEDLANDLast fall, television stations carried a 60-second ad for Audi’s A6 car. The opening images showed a pitted, potholed American road while the voice-over gloomily intoned, “Across the nation, over 100,000 miles of highways and bridges are in disrepair.” Fear not, said the voice; Audi’s smart gizmos would help. The spot’s message was clear: Roads in the United States are now so bad, you need a foreign car to negotiate them.The Audi ad was seized upon as evidence of American decline, now such a regular meme that the Foreign Policy magazine Web site runs a dedicated blog, “Decline Watch.” Books have been in plentiful supply, and now come two more, helpfully approaching the subject from left and right, as if to demonstrate declinism’s bipartisan credentials.
The authors are big hitters in the geopolitics genre. Robert Kagan coined what passes for a catchphrase in the international relations field when he declared a decade ago that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.” At the time, Kagan, a veteran of Ronald Reagan’s State Department, was one of the leading advocates of military action against Iraq
. Zbigniew Brzezinski, still best known for his service as national security adviser to Jimmy Carter, has filled the three intervening decades with a throng of books on the same terrain: what America should do in the world. As you’d expect, there are big differences between the two. Kagan barely mentions the Iraq war in “The World America Made,” and certainly feels no need to explain his past enthusiasm for a decision that many now regard as a calamity. By contrast, Brzezinski is scathing in “Strategic Vision,” judging Iraq “a costly diversion” from the fight against Al Qaeda. The war, he says, was justified by dubious claims about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction that “evaporated altogether within a few months” and that sapped America’s international standing.
The former Carterofficial regards climate change as a grave global threat; the ex-Reaganappointee hardly mentions it. When Brzezinski lays out the obstacles toAmerica’s keeping its position as international top dog, he includesever-widening inequality between the richest and the rest — offering statisticsthat would fit well on an Occupy Wall Street placard — and an unsustainablefinancial system that benefits “greedy Wall Street speculators.” Reform isneeded, he writes, not only to ensure growth but to foster the “socialconsensus and democratic stability” at home without which the United Statescannot be a force abroad. Kagan allows that the post-2008 woes look likecapitalism “discrediting itself” but confidently asserts that “the liberaleconomic order is in everyone’s interest” even as some voices, certainlyoutside the United States, are having severe doubts about key tenets ofneoliberal economics.The two books aredifferent in temperament and style, too, in ways that say much about thecontrast between left and right. Brzezinski’s is full of wonkish detail andsome truly leaden language: “ . . . with the potential international benefitsof the foregoing unfortunately vitiated by the cumulatively destructiveconsequences of continued and maybe even somewhat expanded. . . . ” Kaganprefers to paint with a broad brush, sprinkling a memorable metaphor here, astriking simile there. International “rules and institutions are likescaffolding around a building: they don’t hold the building up; the buildingholds them up” (the building being America). Where Brzezinski can be gloomy,almost channeling the spirit of Jimmy Carter’s notorious “malaise” speech whenhe warns of the excessive materialism and spiritual hollowness of contemporaryAmerican life, Kagan is breezier and sunnier. Reading the books side by side isto be reminded not only of Carter versus Reagan but also of Kerry versus Bush.And yet the greatsurprise is how much they agree with each other, especially on what matters.They both insist that reports of America’s decline are exaggerated. Both notethat the United States still accounts for a quarter of the world’s grossdomestic product, a proportion that has held steady for more than 40 years.Both note America’s military strength, with a budget greater than that of allits rivals combined. As Brzezinski puts it, on every measure “America is stillpeerless.”Usefully,Kagan states that much of the current decline talk is based on a “nostalgic fallacy,”imagining a golden past in which America was all but omnipotent. There neverwas such a time, he says, not even during those periods now remembered as theglory days of American might. Still bathing in the glow of total victory inWorld War II, the country watched events in China, Korea and Indochina that,Dean Acheson lamented, were “beyond the control of the . . . United States.” In1952 Douglas MacArthur warned of “our own relative decline.” Indeed, Kaganshows that declinism is as old as America itself: in 1788, Patrick Henry wasruing the Republic’s fall from the days “when the American spirit was in itsyouth.” Kagan’s message is that America has been gripped by these fears before,only to bounce back: “Anyone who honestly recalls the 1970s, with Watergate,Vietnam, stagflation and the energy crisis, cannot really believe the presentdifficulties are unrivaled.”Both men dismiss thatother plank of declinist conventional wisdom, the assumption that China’s hotbreath is on America’s neck and that it is about to take over. That’s an“overreaction,” Brzezinski writes, on a par with 1980s fears that the UnitedStates was about to become a wholly owned subsidiary of Japan. China is stilldecades behind on all the measures that count and has shown little sign ofwanting to assume America’s central role. It might just be biding its time, butKagan makes a good case that its geopolitical position is not propitious: whilethe United States is flanked by oceans, China is encircled by wary, watchfulneighbors. It cannot so easily head out into the world to serve as a globalnaval power and hegemon.The two authors agreethat it’s in everyone’s interest, not just America’s, for the United States toremain dominant. Kagan frames his essay with a device borrowed from the FrankCapra classic “It’s a Wonderful Life,” imagining the world if America were notthere to play global superpower. He provides a compelling demonstration thatwhether it’s protecting the sea lanes vital for free trade or nudging societiestoward democracy, the world stands a better chance with America in primeposition than it would with China or Russia in the lead. Brzezinski similarlyasks us to imagine the Internet if it were under the de facto stewardship ofMoscow or Beijing rather than Washington.Of the two, it isBrzezinski, predictably, who is more alert to the long history of United Statesintrusion abroad — including the toppling of democratic governments and thegobbling up of developing nations’ resources — that might make non-Americansskeptical of the merits of American dominance. But both are persuasive thatAmerican mastery is better than any plausible alternative (if only because aworld without any dominant power is itself implausible).Above all, Brzezinskiand Kagan unite in arguing against fatalism. American decline is notpreordained, but neither is the status quo. If Americans want to remain on top,they will have to fight for that position, making some painful changes in theprocess (including, Brzezinski says, to a dysfunctional, paralyzed politicalsystem). But it’s worth it, chiefly because the current international order —more or less stable and free from world war for seven decades — will notmaintain itself. Given what else is out there, the world still needs America.JonathanFreedland is an editorial page columnist for The Guardian of London.
STRATEGIC VISIONAmerica and theCrisis of Global PowerBy Zbigniew BrzezinskiIllustrated.208 pp. Basic Books. $26.THE WORLD AMERICA MADEBy Robert Kagan149pp. Alfred A. Knopf. $21.
liberals10
The authors are big hitters in the geopolitics genre. Robert Kagan coined what passes for a catchphrase in the international relations field when he declared a decade ago that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.” At the time, Kagan, a veteran of Ronald Reagan’s State Department, was one of the leading advocates of military action against Iraq
The former Carterofficial regards climate change as a grave global threat; the ex-Reaganappointee hardly mentions it. When Brzezinski lays out the obstacles toAmerica’s keeping its position as international top dog, he includesever-widening inequality between the richest and the rest — offering statisticsthat would fit well on an Occupy Wall Street placard — and an unsustainablefinancial system that benefits “greedy Wall Street speculators.” Reform isneeded, he writes, not only to ensure growth but to foster the “socialconsensus and democratic stability” at home without which the United Statescannot be a force abroad. Kagan allows that the post-2008 woes look likecapitalism “discrediting itself” but confidently asserts that “the liberaleconomic order is in everyone’s interest” even as some voices, certainlyoutside the United States, are having severe doubts about key tenets ofneoliberal economics.The two books aredifferent in temperament and style, too, in ways that say much about thecontrast between left and right. Brzezinski’s is full of wonkish detail andsome truly leaden language: “ . . . with the potential international benefitsof the foregoing unfortunately vitiated by the cumulatively destructiveconsequences of continued and maybe even somewhat expanded. . . . ” Kaganprefers to paint with a broad brush, sprinkling a memorable metaphor here, astriking simile there. International “rules and institutions are likescaffolding around a building: they don’t hold the building up; the buildingholds them up” (the building being America). Where Brzezinski can be gloomy,almost channeling the spirit of Jimmy Carter’s notorious “malaise” speech whenhe warns of the excessive materialism and spiritual hollowness of contemporaryAmerican life, Kagan is breezier and sunnier. Reading the books side by side isto be reminded not only of Carter versus Reagan but also of Kerry versus Bush.And yet the greatsurprise is how much they agree with each other, especially on what matters.They both insist that reports of America’s decline are exaggerated. Both notethat the United States still accounts for a quarter of the world’s grossdomestic product, a proportion that has held steady for more than 40 years.Both note America’s military strength, with a budget greater than that of allits rivals combined. As Brzezinski puts it, on every measure “America is stillpeerless.”Usefully,Kagan states that much of the current decline talk is based on a “nostalgic fallacy,”imagining a golden past in which America was all but omnipotent. There neverwas such a time, he says, not even during those periods now remembered as theglory days of American might. Still bathing in the glow of total victory inWorld War II, the country watched events in China, Korea and Indochina that,Dean Acheson lamented, were “beyond the control of the . . . United States.” In1952 Douglas MacArthur warned of “our own relative decline.” Indeed, Kaganshows that declinism is as old as America itself: in 1788, Patrick Henry wasruing the Republic’s fall from the days “when the American spirit was in itsyouth.” Kagan’s message is that America has been gripped by these fears before,only to bounce back: “Anyone who honestly recalls the 1970s, with Watergate,Vietnam, stagflation and the energy crisis, cannot really believe the presentdifficulties are unrivaled.”Both men dismiss thatother plank of declinist conventional wisdom, the assumption that China’s hotbreath is on America’s neck and that it is about to take over. That’s an“overreaction,” Brzezinski writes, on a par with 1980s fears that the UnitedStates was about to become a wholly owned subsidiary of Japan. China is stilldecades behind on all the measures that count and has shown little sign ofwanting to assume America’s central role. It might just be biding its time, butKagan makes a good case that its geopolitical position is not propitious: whilethe United States is flanked by oceans, China is encircled by wary, watchfulneighbors. It cannot so easily head out into the world to serve as a globalnaval power and hegemon.The two authors agreethat it’s in everyone’s interest, not just America’s, for the United States toremain dominant. Kagan frames his essay with a device borrowed from the FrankCapra classic “It’s a Wonderful Life,” imagining the world if America were notthere to play global superpower. He provides a compelling demonstration thatwhether it’s protecting the sea lanes vital for free trade or nudging societiestoward democracy, the world stands a better chance with America in primeposition than it would with China or Russia in the lead. Brzezinski similarlyasks us to imagine the Internet if it were under the de facto stewardship ofMoscow or Beijing rather than Washington.Of the two, it isBrzezinski, predictably, who is more alert to the long history of United Statesintrusion abroad — including the toppling of democratic governments and thegobbling up of developing nations’ resources — that might make non-Americansskeptical of the merits of American dominance. But both are persuasive thatAmerican mastery is better than any plausible alternative (if only because aworld without any dominant power is itself implausible).Above all, Brzezinskiand Kagan unite in arguing against fatalism. American decline is notpreordained, but neither is the status quo. If Americans want to remain on top,they will have to fight for that position, making some painful changes in theprocess (including, Brzezinski says, to a dysfunctional, paralyzed politicalsystem). But it’s worth it, chiefly because the current international order —more or less stable and free from world war for seven decades — will notmaintain itself. Given what else is out there, the world still needs America.JonathanFreedland is an editorial page columnist for The Guardian of London.
STRATEGIC VISIONAmerica and theCrisis of Global PowerBy Zbigniew BrzezinskiIllustrated.208 pp. Basic Books. $26.THE WORLD AMERICA MADEBy Robert Kagan149pp. Alfred A. Knopf. $21.
liberals10
ΦΩΤΟΓΡΑΦΙΕΣ
ΜΟΙΡΑΣΤΕΙΤΕ
ΔΕΙΤΕ ΑΚΟΜΑ
ΕΠΟΜΕΝΟ ΑΡΘΡΟ
Βλαστικά κύτταρα για την θεραπεία της οστεοαρθρίτιδας
ΣΧΟΛΙΑΣΤΕ
![Νέα Yoga Book 9i με διπλή οθόνη, Smart Paper και Tab Extreme [CES 2023]](https://www.newsnowgr.com/static/gfx/nn124x78.gif)
